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THE LOGISTICS AUGMENTATION PROGRAM: WHAT IS THE STATUS TODAY?
America's fighting forces are the finest in the world. But the U.S. military is more than its fighting forces. It is a broad complex of military, civilian, and contract personnel who equip, support, and sustain -in hundreds of thousands of ways every day -the men and women who put their lives on the line. 
BACKGROUND
Throughout its history, the Army has used contractors to support operations. 
TYPES OF CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD
United States doctrine today, as laid out in Joint Pub 4.0, 3 FM 3-0, 4 and FM 3-100. 21, 5 breaks down contractors on the battlefield into three primary types. These are systems, external support, and theater support contractors.
Systems contractors support specific material systems throughout their life cycle in both war and peace. These prearranged contracts are awarded by the program manager/evaluation office or the US Army Material Command (AMC). Supported systems include vehicles, weapon systems, aircraft, command and control systems, and communications equipment.
External support contracts are awarded by contracting offices outside of a theater of operations by supporting agencies such as AMC or the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). They are designed to provide a variety of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) to deployed forces in the theater of operations and can be either prearranged or let during the contingency. The Army's LOGCAP program is an external support contract.
Finally, there are theater support contracts, also known as contingency contracts. These provide goods, services, and minor construction, to meet the immediate operational needs of the commander. 6 The key difference between these and external support contracts is that they operate under the contracting authority of the theater in which they take place while external support contracts are let under contracting authority external to the theater.
HISTORY OF CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD
The United States Army has utilized contractors on the battlefield throughout its history.
The nature and characteristics of this support, however, has changed over time. This evolution breaks down into four distinct periods of contracted support and/or contract management. The trend towards increased system contractors on the battlefield continued in the Korean
Conflict as did the contracting of support services, primarily in the fields of labor and transportation.
The third distinct period in the U.S. Army's use of contractors was introduced in the Vietnam Conflict and continued through the Gulf War. In Vietnam, contractor employment patterns changed. They were now side by side with soldiers, for the first time an essential portion of the overall logistics support equation within the theater of operations with a broader range of duties. 9 In addition to expanded logistical functions, contractors also took over a number of construction projects to include the building of a number of base camps and the Cam Rahn Bay naval facility. 10 The nature of this contracting effort, however, was very ad hoc Following the Gulf War, the U.S. Army entered its fourth period of contractor support: the development and use of LOGCAP as a warm base centralized contracting hub for providing support services to soldiers on the battlefield. 23 The contract had six major components: development of a worldwide management plan that could be used globally to support the planning force; development of 13 country specific plans using specific planning data from regional combatant commanders;
updating regional and worldwide plans annually; development of a worldwide database of potential support sources; annually participating in at least two exercises; and executing the plan upon alert notification. 24 The contract based planning on providing base camp equipment, facilities, and supporting services on a force of up to 20,000 soldiers in five base camps. This included billeting, showers, meals, laundry, utilities, potable water, sanitation, maintenance, and other support. BRSC was required to deploy an advanced party within 72 hours of notification and the first base camp was required to be operational by Day -16. All five base camps were required to be turn key facilities and be completed no later than Day -31. The five base camps were broken down into four forward support base camps and one rear support camp. The rear support camp provided services at one seaport of debarkation (SPOD) and one airport of debarkation (APOD). 25 At the rear SPOD/APOD facilities BRSC was required to support port reception, staging, and onward movement operations. Finally, BRSC was required to plan for expanded theater support for 50,000 soldiers. 26 LOGCAP was first tested in December 1992 with the execution of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. In all, BRSC provided over $106,000,000 in support services to over 22,000 U.S. and U.N. troops. 27 In the course of the operation, BRSC performed base camp construction and maintenance; food service; laundry and field showers; latrines, sewage, and solid waste removal; receipt, storage, and issue of bulk fuel; production, storage, and distribution of water; local and line haul transportation of personnel and cargo; power production and distribution; and linguist support. 28 Though several problem areas were identified, the LOGCAP operation was an overall success. This is especially true considering that BRSC and its subcontractors operated in an environment with a near total lack of infrastructure and a significant security risk. 29 LOGCAP was next tested in Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda in August 1994. The contractor produced, stored, and distributed approximately 500,000 gallons of potable water a day to refugee camps in and around Goma, Zaire. 30 Total contractor charges to the U.S. Army for the operation were $63,000,000. 31 This support requirement was quickly followed in and to provide the transportation of personnel, cargo, and the mail. 34 The number of base camps soon expanded from 12 to 33. 35 To accomplish this huge task BRSC developed an immense infrastructure in the Balkans that at its height employed approximately 6,766 personnel in theater, excluding Kosovo, as well as a vast number of subcontractor personnel. 36 In Kosovo the contractor employed 5,500 workers, 5,000 of whom were local nationals, making
Brown & Root the largest employer in the country. 37 The military force structure replacement by BRSC in the Balkans was significant. The G4 for Task Force (TF) Eagle summed it up nicely, writing, Several studies were conducted to quantify and qualify the capabilities civilian contractors brought to Task Force Eagle, in terms of the number of soldiers displaced through the use of contractor logistics support. One such study concluded that to replace BRSC alone, the Army would have needed a reinforced corps support group and two engineer battalions capable of vertical and horizontal construction. Unfortunately for DynCorp, the estimated profit alone from BRSC's Balkan contract over this same time period exceeded all DoD funds paid to DynCorp for all these operations combined. 44 The nature and terms of DynCorp's LOGCAP contract differed in two ways from BRSC's previous LOGCAP contract. First, a set fee was paid for the planning portion of the contract instead of cost plus fee. 45 Cost plus fee means that quarterly during an operation the government evaluates the contractor's performance and can award a fee in addition to the cost of services provided, in this case up to eight percent. Secondly, this contract differed in that it was a one year contract with four one-year renewals instead of a five year contract. 46 Though these DynCorp's supported LOGCAP operations were small, they were nevertheless very important to the LOGCAP program as many improvements to the program were developed and executed during these operations, all these reported problems, why has the use of contractors not only continued but dramatically increased? The answer is that there are a lot of benefits to using contractors and those benefits outweigh the liabilities.
One of the biggest benefits to using contractors is cost. In most cases, using civilian contractors on the battlefield to provide support services is cheaper than using soldiers. As one oft quoted author on the subject points out, "contractors can provide expertise on a case-by- Additionally, military force structure often has a force cap, usually for political reasons.
Force caps impose a ceiling on the number of soldiers that can be deployed into a defined area.
Contractors expand this limit. 60 These force caps usually do not apply to contractors. Vietnam, the Balkans, and OEF-PHILIPPINES are all examples of the Army maximizing the number of combat troops deployed on an operation with a politically imposed force cap and then maximizing civilian contractor CS/CSS assets to fill the resulting shortfall in support services.
Finally, the sometimes significant socio-economic benefits that contractors bring to local communities and local economies as employers can produce both political and economic leverage for the United States and the local American force commander. The previously mentioned example of BRSC being the single largest employer in Kosovo displays how dynamic this factor can be.
ISSUES WITH LOGCAP AND CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD
Of the four services, only the Army has developed substantial guidance for dealing with contractors. 74 This can range from constant force protection as in Somalia to limited force protection as in Bosnia. 75 It can take the form of armed escorts, armored vehicles, reinforced structures, and protective equipment to safeguard against weapons of mass effect. 76 One additional aspect of force protection deals with the question of civilian contractors being armed. The legal status of civilian contractors on the battlefield as persons authorized to accompany the force precludes them from carrying offensive weapons. To do so would make them illegal combatants. DoD interprets this to mean that contractors generally are not armed. 77 The Army and USAF interpret this to mean a contractor can be armed if they carry a defensive weapon strictly for self defense. Both services interpret a defensive weapon as an M-9 9mm
pistol with military standard ammunition 78 and both services require that three conditions are met before contractors are allowed to be armed: the first operational commander in the chain of command approves, the contract employees company permits weapons issue, and the contract employee agrees to carry the weapon. 79 CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, RELIABILITY, AND DISCIPLINE Accountability, reliability, and disciple are interrelated concepts that have all been significant problem areas in the Army's use of contractors on the battlefield. All three areas come down to the question of will contractors be there when the military needs them with the level of support required.
Accountability is the administrative accounting for contractor personnel in the theater of operations. It is important because it tells the Army if the contractor is adequately manned to perform its contracted functions. The bottom line is that there is presently no mechanism to force the contractor and contract employees to employ a personnel accountability system or to interact with the military personnel accountability system to attain accurate contractor personnel visibility. The more permissive a theater of operations is, the worse this problem appears to be.
In the Balkans, contractor personnel accountability was terrible. Contract employees flew to Hungary, drove into the Balkans in rental cars, and rented apartments off the base camp installations. 80 Even in Iraq today under the LOGCAP III contract and its many subcontractors, accountability of contract employees is weak. Many contractors still enter the area commercially from Kuwait, Turkey, and Syria.
Reliability deals with the likelihood of the contractor completing the terms of the contract regardless of conditions. Though this has not been historically a significant problem in the LOGCAP program, it is unfortunately also true that there is still nothing the Army can do to prevent contractors from terminating their contracts when confronted with significant threat. The issue revolves around the legal point that contractor personnel can not be compelled to remain at their post once hostilities are underway. 81 They can legally unilaterally terminate their contracts rather than accept potential danger if required to operate in a combat zone. 82 The U.S. Navy's Operational Law Department summed it up well, noting that forcing contractors to perform is, …highly improbable…there can not be involuntary servitude in the United States. Even a contractor who agrees to perform a certain function could walk away and breach the contract. The government could sue for breach and ask a judge for specific performance, but even if the contractor failed to perform, it would not be criminal, and they could just walk away. Also, a military commander has the ability to withdraw privileges from a contractor employee due to that individual's unsatisfactory behavior. These privileges include entry to installations, medical facilities, dining facilities, and base exchanges. 85 Finally and most importantly, the contractor and contract employee can be disciplined by the terms of the contract. Joint Pub 4.0 states clearly that contractor employees are disciplined by the contractor through the terms of the employee to employer relationship and not by the commander. 86 This is a very powerful tool when working with contractors if used correctly. The contracting officer has the authority to direct the contractor (not the contract employees) through the contract. Terms and conditions can be constructed to include provisions requiring contractor personnel to abide by all guidance and obey all instructions and general orders applicable to U.S.
Armed Forces and Department of Defense civilians to include those of the theater commander. The contractor can also be required to take reasonable steps to ensure his personnel comply with these provisions and ensure the good conduct of his employees. 87 Furthermore, the contractor can be required to promptly resolve, to the satisfaction of the contracting officer, all contractor employee performance and conduct problems identified by the contracting officer.
CONTRACTOR PLACEMENT ON THE BATTLEFIELD
Contractor placement on the battlefield relates to where contractors can be used on the battlefield due to the level of threat. It would seem at first glance that in relation to the LOGCAP program this problem has been eliminated as the LOGCAP III contract requires KBR to operate in any threat condition and the contractor has agreed.
Unfortunately, as previously discussed under contractor reliability, contractors confronted with a significant threat are not legally bound to complete the terms of their contract. Because of this risk, contractors really can not be depended upon beyond medium threat conditions to provide sometimes critical CS/CSS.
CONTRACTOR READINESS
Contractor readiness under the LOGCAP umbrella support contract relates to the contractors' ability to rapidly deploy to provide critical CS/CSS in the early phases of a military
operation. An important aspect of contractor readiness is not only the ability to deploy quickly, but the ability to deploy quickly with the capability to provide the required levels of effective Planning is the key to contractor readiness. This includes both preplanning what support services contractors will provide to a given contingency operation as well as the specific requirements for deployment of contractor personnel and equipment into the AOR. This interaction in logistical planning is the essence of the LOGCAP program which pays the LOGCAP contractor, currently KBR, to develop a Worldwide Management Staffing Plan (WMSP) and create a worldwide vendor list from which it can obtain required supplies and services. 89 The WMSP is a baseline generic plan for supporting 25,000 troops for up to 180 days anywhere in the world. From the WMSP, AMC and contractor planners create a generic plan for both developed and undeveloped countries. These are then refined to create regionally based plans and then further refined to support specific Regional Combatant Command and ASCC plans. 90 Once contractor support for a plan has been determined, then additional analysis and planning is required to ensure contractor deployment timelines support requirements in the theater. 91 This is required to confirm contractor deployment issues are Responsible for Contracting (PARC) who he appoints. 94 The HCA is a general officer, usually the senior commander in the theater, who provides overall guidance throughout the contingency and serves as the approving authority for contracting as stipulated in regulatory guidance. 95 The PARC is the commander's senior Army acquisition advisor responsible for planning and managing all Army contracting functions within the theater. 96 All Army contracting officers in theater except those belonging to USACE and AMC operate under the procurement authority of the PARC. 97 USACE and AMC contracting officers retain procurement authority from those commands but operate under the functional control of the theater PARC while in theater, subject to the PARC's contracting support plan. 98 This is important for LOGCAP because it is an AMC contract. The PARC exercises functional control of contracting over all contracting personnel from any Army agency or supporting command through the acquisition review board (ARB). 99 In a joint environment, the PARC (thus Army) may be the designated executive agent for theater contracting with responsibility to coordinate all DoD contracting activities. 100 In this case the ARB would become a Joint ARB (JARB). The process to resource new requirements in theater begins when the supported user identifies the requirement to the supporting S4/G4/J4. 101 The Relative to contractor reliability and placement on the battlefield, the road ahead is driven by the commander's need to mitigate risk to U.S. military forces caused by the contractor's ability to unilaterally terminate a contract when perceived to be in danger on the battlefield. To accomplish this risk mitigation, the Army must develop a threat template and the doctrine to ensure a complete threat analysis is conducted during the logistical planning process for contingency operations. Perceived threat levels beyond the acceptable risk from this template would result in a default recommendation to the commander to use military support forces in lieu of contractors for critical CS/CSS functions.
The road ahead for the problem areas of contractor accountability and discipline needs to utilize the terms of the contract itself to obtain the desired behavior from contractors and contract employees. By writing very specific requirements for contractor personnel reporting and contractor personnel behavior into the contract, much can be done to correct current shortfalls in these two areas. This is especially true if the violation of contract terms is linked directly to contractor performance in the award determination process of cost plus contracts.
Contract terms can further specify that contract personnel violating personnel discipline contract terms must be immediately replaced by the contractor on a non-reimbursable basis.
Contractor responsiveness in the future can primarily be improved, short of contract reform, by maximizing the dollar threshold amount for validating and approving changes to the SOW 'in country' during contingency operations. As was pointed out previously in this project, requirements validated and approved on location during contingencies are almost always executed faster and are more responsive than those passed back to ASCC or joint headquarters. Thus by increasing the dollar threshold amounts for approval of requirements 'in country', the number of requirements that can be validated and approved faster is increased.
Finally, since 1997 the Army has created an outstanding doctrine for LOGCAP and the use of contractors on the battlefield but this doctrine is still incomplete and in need of further refinement. As can be seen in almost every problem area aforementioned in the road ahead for improving the LOGCAP program and contracting on the battlefield, the development or revision of doctrine is in one way or another almost always required.
CONCLUSION
Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.
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In conclusion, the LOGCAP program is now providing the most responsive and effective contracted CS/CSS support in the history of the U.S. Army. The program is both viable and necessary for the Army to continue at its current OPTEMPO. Having said this, however, continued work to mitigate and eliminate problem areas will reduce program resource requirements, raise efficiency to new heights, and should be pursued aggressively.
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